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The turnaround of the telecom company Ericsson is considered a unique chapter in Swedish 
business life in terms of complexity, size and speed. This paper focuses on implications of the 
transformation for how the management views the world and how the organizational setting is 
restructured. Instead of making a conventional study of a change process this study uses 
narrative method and explores the transformation through the eyes of four people, two top 
managers and two middle managers. In this way it hopes to present a picture of some of the 
knowledge building that takes place during events like this, since storytelling seems to be 
crucial when people make sense of their everyday life. A narrative analysis will not result in 
the one “true” account of a phenomenon. However, it can provide detailed insights into 
individual informants understanding of events and highlight similarities and differences in 
interpretations that are interesting also for outsiders to take part of. The findings in this study 
indicate...  
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  1Introduction 
 
This study explores a unique chapter in Swedish business life, the turnaround of the telecom 
company Ericsson. It focuses on implications of the turnaround on how the management 
interprets their world and how to act and the organizational setting is re-structured. Studying 
change processes is a common undertaking among organizational researchers. By using 
narrative method this study hopes to be able to present a picture of some of the knowledge 
building that takes place during events like this, since storytelling seems to be crucial when 
people make sense of their everyday life. A narrative analysis will not result in the one “true” 
account of a phenomenon. However, it may provide interesting insights into individual 
informants understanding of events and highlight similarities and differences in 
interpretations among informants that are of value also for others to take part of.  
 
The section that follows informs about the theoretical framework that this study uses. How 
research has been conducted is then described. Then the data obtained are analyzed and 
interpreted and the findings summarized and discussed. 
 
Interpretative schemes structures and re-structures an organizational 
setting 
 
A theoretical framework that combines cognitive theories about the use of interpretative 
schemes with theories about knowledge management has been used as an analytical tool 
during this research. Interpretative schemes may be defined as mental schemas developed in a 
specific organizational setting (Fiske and Taylor, 1991). They can also be defined as 
standardized elements of stocks of knowledge applied by actors in the production of 
interactions (Giddens, 1984, 1979). They influence how communication and interactions take 
place in an organizational setting. This is because when human actors communicate they draw 
on interpretative schemes to help make sense of interactions; at the same time those 
interactions reproduce and modify those interpretative schemes which are embedded in social 
structure as meaning or signification. Interpretative schemes can also be described as 
cognitive structures that represent ones knowledge about a given concept or stimulus 
including its attributes and the relations among those attributes. A schema influences the 
encoding of new information, memory of old information and inferences about missing 
information. It is a way of organizing information about the world relevant to a particular task 
and functions as a filtering mechanism. It facilitates top-down, conceptually driven, or theory-
driven processes which means processes that are influenced by prior knowledge. As an 
example there are person-schemas, role-schemas, event-schemas and place-schemas. A 
person-schema influences how a person views him or herself as a human being and relates to 
other human beings. A role-schema can be expressed when a person act according to his or 
her job. Event-schemas are cognitive structures that influence how we perform certain events 
and place-schemas influence how we perform certain tasks at certain places. Then individual 
cognitive schemes can combine to form an overall interpretative schema mapping relevant 
aspects of how an organization experiences of the world is to be understood (Ranson et al 
1980), and assumptions about why events happens as they do and how people are to act 
(Bartunek 1984). 
 
Phenomenon such as categories and mental schemas allow human beings some sense of 
prediction and control, which is essential to our wellbeing. They make us believe that we 
understand the world. Also they are difficult to change. People ignore exceptions to a mental 
schema, they even interpret the exception as proving the schema. Many of the information-
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with slightly discrepant information. But having an incorrect schema is also costly since it can 
make people inadequate problem solvers. The wrong mental schema can lead one to be 
inaccurate, biasing encoding, memory, and inference. But nevertheless mental schemas are 
believed to be cognitively more efficient than understanding each instance afresh (Fiske and 
Taylor, 1991). Interpretative schemes are supposed to influence and transform how tools are 
used and processes executed in organizations. Then tools and processes help to structure how 
knowledge is exercised in this organization and the context surrounding a knowledge worker 
structured.  
 
Knowledge management and learning 
 
Theories about knowledge management have grown out of earlier research about information 
management and organizational learning. Information management can be described as the 
management of information resources, the information of management tools and technologies, 
or the management of information policies and standards (Choo, 1998). Organizational  
learning used to focus on people and human resource management while knowledge  
management is supposed to be something more. It is supposed to improve “factors that lead to  
superior performance: organizational creativity, operational effectiveness and quality of  
products and services” (Wiig, 1993). 
 
In real-life situations the practice of managing knowledge may consist of intra-organizational 
and/or inter-organizational activities. When mobilizing internal knowledge, information 
processes are managed to promote the sharing of information, conversion of tacit knowledge, 
experimenting and prototyping and the migration of knowledge to other parts of the 
organization. The transfer of knowledge from an individual to a group level might for 
example occur through the development of a unique language or a code which allows group 
members to learn who knows what and to coordinate their activities. But before this is 
possible one has to investigate and make visible what kind of knowledge that exists and this 
can be done through knowledge-audits organized by the management.  
 
There are three critical factors that concern knowledge integration: shared experiences, shared 
symbolism captured in metaphors and logos and shared artefacts. Then the effectiveness of 
integration mechanisms depends on the existence of a common knowledge and other forms of 
symbolic communication, the commonality of specialized knowledge, shared meaning and the 
recognition of individual knowledge domains.  
 
The creation of new knowledge is often stimulated by a situation that identifies gaps in the 
existing knowledge of the organization. Such gaps stand in the way of solving a technical or 
task-related problem, designing a new product or service, or taking advantage of an 
opportunity. Choo (1998) uses a general metaphor for knowledge creation that is “looking 
across many levels”. It means that new knowledge is created by sharing and shifting 
knowledge across many organizational levels, including individuals, groups and other 
organizations. Knowledge creation can be achieved through recognizing the synergistic 
relationship between tacit and explicit knowledge and through the design of social processes 
that create new knowledge by converting tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge. 
 
As an example, Leonard Barton (1995) suggests following knowledge building activities: 
shared problem solving, experimenting and prototyping, implementing and integrating new 
processes and tools and importing knowledge from outside. During the activity of shared 
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brought together so that the diversity of their knowledge and back-ground can be channelled 
toward creative problem solving. As people become highly skilled they develop individual 
“signature skill”, which are formed from their specialization, cognitive style preferences, and 
preferences for particular tools or methods. Bringing people with diverse signature skills 
together to work on a problem generates a situation that can be fertile for innovations. When 
integrating and implementing new methods and tools is proprietary knowledge introduced 
into process tools and methods that improve internal operation. To ensure successful 
implementation user involvement is essential since the future users of the tool will have 
critical information that must be integrated during design. Through the activity of 
experimenting and prototyping the organization extends its existing capabilities as well as 
builds new capabilities for the future. In situations like this  ”intelligent failures” provide 
valuable lessons.  
 
The strategic knowledge of any organization lies in its long-term, knowledge-generating  
capabilities which it has built up over time. These capabilities are the result of the quality of  
its internal network of people, skills, communications, information resources, and cultural  
norms and the quality of its external network of relationships with customers, suppliers,  
distributors, information sources and other associates.  
 
The organizational context exposes a knowledge worker to cultural, rule-based and 
background knowledge. Cultural knowledge is a filter that helps us place a value on certain 
parts of knowledge and also keeps out knowledge that is deemed unimportant by the 
dominant group in a culture or organization. Choo (1998) describes cultural knowledge as 
knowledge that: “Includes the assumptions and beliefs that are used to describe and explain 
reality, as well as the conventions and expectations that are used to assign value and 
significance to new information. These shared beliefs, norms and values form the framework 
in which organizational members construct reality, recognize the saliency of new information 
and evaluate alternative interpretations and actions”  Rule-based knowledge guides action by 
answering three questions: What kind of situation is this? What kind of person am I or What 
kind of organization is this? What does a person such as I, or an organization such as this, do 
in a situation such as this? Back-ground knowledge is defined by Choo as knowledge that is 
part of the organizational culture and communicated through stories, metaphors, analogies, 
visions, and mission statements. It supplies the world-view by which people in the 
organization understand and make sense of events, actions, objects, utterances or situations. 
The two concepts background knowledge and/or cultural knowledge can be used intertwined 
and the difference between them is blurred (Choo, 1995). Cultural, rule-based and background 
knowledge influence how interactions take place and interpretative schemes develop in 
organizational settings.  
 
Narratives and Narrative Method 
 
The overall perspective that has been guiding this research is that we belong to several 
thinking collectives (denk-kollektiv) each characterized by a special thought style (Fleck, 
1934/1997) and that parts of our world are socially constructed (Mead,1934, Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966/1991). The common features of social constructionism are a rejection of a 
dualistic ontology, of an objectivist epistemology, of the individual as the foundation of 
knowledge and of language as a mirror of objective reality. Instead social constructionism 
regards subject and object as an inseparable relation. In the social construction of reality there 
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as externalization, objectivation and internalization.  
 
During primary socialization we internalize language, greetings and gender, things that 
regulate the most common activities and interactions among people. Later secondary 
socialization includes processes in which individuals internalize aspects of reality such as 
professions. As we increasingly become part of reality through primary and secondary 
socialization, we begin to reproduce it ourselves. So what is going on in our everyday world is 
an ongoing reproduction rather than an ongoing production of reality. Reality is mediated 
through our lived experiences. Our description of a phenomenon is always colored by our 
specific historical, cultural and linguistic understanding of reality. Social interaction between 
people is the primary vehicle for developing this knowledge. And language does not achieve 
its meaning primarily through a correspondence with objective reality, but rather through the 
way we socially define and use it. Mead (1934) looks at language as a principle of social 
organization which has made the distinctively human society possible. It means that it is 
important what people say and how they say it. Also the British critic Peter Brooks writes in 
”Reading for the plot” (1985) that :”Our lives are ceaselessly intertwined with narrative, with 
the stories that we tell…” 
 
A narrative in its most basic form requires at least three elements, an original state of affairs, 
an action or an event, and the consequent state of affairs. Basic narratives can carry a load of 
ambiguity and therefore leave openings for negotiation. But narrative and metaphors cannot 
replace one another because they have different tasks to accomplish. A narrative is a mode of 
association whereas metaphor is a mode of substitution. 
 
Narratives are texts that present events developing in time according to impersonal causes or 
human intentions. They are the main carriers of knowledge in modern societies toward the 
end of the 20P
th
P century (C, 1998). 
 
Qualitative research using narrative methods enables researchers to place themselves at the 
interface between persons, stories and organizations and to place the person in emotional and 
organizational context. Using narrative during fieldwork is an expression of curiosity of the 
other, and how others construct their worlds (C, 1998). 
 
Storytelling is an art of weaving, of constructing, the product of intimate knowledge (Gabriel, 
?).  Storytelling opens valuable windows into the emotional, political and symbolic lives of 
organizations offering researchers a powerful instrument for carrying out research. By 
collecting stories in different organizations by listening and comparing different accounts by 
investigating how narratives are constructed around specific events, by examining which 
events in an organizations history generate stories and which ones fail to do so, we gain 
access to deeper organizational realities, closely linked to their members experiences 
(Gabriel). Stories are valuable but precarious artefacts and storytelling an important narrative 
craft. Stories emerges as the great factories of meaning, creating it, transforming it, testing it, 
sustaining it, fashioning it and refashioning it. 
 
Stories are emotionally and symbolically charged narratives. They do not present information 
or facts about events but they enrich, enhance and infuse facts with meaning. This is both 
their strength and their potential weakness. Stories will often compromise accuracy in the 
interest of poetic effect, itself an expression of deeper fantasies, wishes and desires. They may 
focus on the incidential details, remaining stubbornly silent about what a researcher may 
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illogicalities, and ambiguities. Ultimately the truth of a story lies not in its accuracy but in its 
meaning and paradoxically the inaccuracy, the distortion or even the lie in a story can offer a 
path towards the deeper truth it contains at an individual or collective level. 
 
Storytelling plays an important role and may inform decision-making in organizations since it 
helps people to consolidate experiences to make them available in the future to ourselves and 
others. Storytelling allows the individuals to keep track of the sequences of behavior and their 
theories about why things happen. It helps people work towards imposing a coherent, causal 
account on apparently random sequences of events to decide how to react. Storytelling is a 
social process and the insights accumulated are not private substances but socially constructed 
and distributed (Brown and Duguid, 1991). To the extent that narratives are linked into 
broader discursive structures that influence their interpretations, they may be used to justify 
and legitimize actions (Vaara 2002). In organizations collective storytelling is performed as a 




Organizations are institutionalized action nets, not groups of people and not communities, 
although they for periods of time might behave as such. (C, 1998) In their desire to be as 
modern and scientific as possible contemporary organizations tend to ignore the role of 
narrative in learning, at least in their programmatic attempts to influence organizational 
learning. Organizational narratives are both inscriptions of past performances and scripts and 
staging instructions for future performances. 
 
Narrative enters organization studies in at least four forms: organizational research that is 
written in a story-like fashion, organizational research that collects organizational stories, 
organizational research that conceptualizes organizational life as story making and 
organization theory as story reading (interpretative approaches). Narrative forms of 
organization studies are easiest to find in case studies: research cases, educational cases and 
fictive cases that use chronology as the main organizing device. Now organizational 
narratives as the main mode of knowing and communicating in organizations have become an 
important focus for organizational researchers. 
 
Organizational stories are currently studied in different ways, as example of organizational 
symbolism and culture, as expressions of unconscious whishes and fantasies, as vehicles for 
organizational communication and learning, as expression of political domination and 
opposition, as dramatic performances, as occasions for emotional discharge, as narrative 
structures and so on. (Gabriel, Y. 1998) 
 
The truth of a story lies not in the fact but in the meaning. Aristotle viewed stories as 
emotional-symbolic texts and used the term “poetics” to describe the type of work that is 
involved in transforming facts into stories. The storyteller is concerned not with “facts-as-
information” but with “facts-as-experience”. The telling of organizational stories frequently 
moves beyond entertainment seeking to educate, persuade, warn, reassure, justify, explain and 
console the people concerned. 
 
Reflections on how work has been performed 
 
  6This study has also been influenced by the American sociologist Elliot Mishler who is critical 
about how interviews normally are done. He writes that we expect short answers and answers 
only on the questions we pose. As an interviewer we interrupt people when they start telling 
stories, or we do not code the stories since they do not fit into the conventional categories we 
already use. The human beings that appear in the material become artificial. Important aspects 
of their stories disappear and they give predicted answers on predictable questions.  
 
The unit of analysis in this case is management and how their interpretations of how to act 




Narrators abstract  Segments in which the narrator summarizes the events 
and outcome of the story. 
Narrators perspective  Segments or use of language ( e.g., “I” or “we” versus 
“they”) in which the narrator reveals his or her 
perspective on events in the narrative. 
Orientation/contextual descriptions  Segments in which the narrator provides contextual 
information which does not contribute to the movement 
of action through time. 
Actors  Segments or use of language (e.g., “I” or “we” versus 
“they”) which indicate who carried out actions or 
contributed to events depicted in the narrative. 
Problematic situation  Segments in which the narrator describes his or her 
perspective of the noncanonical or exceptional 
circumstances which motivates actions described in the 
narrative. 
Goal/problem solution  Segments in which the narrator describes his or her 
perceptions of how the problematic situation could be 
or was resolved. 
Actions and events  Narrative clause segments: 
•Actions are activities that occur during the time span 
of the narrative that have a strict temporal sequencing. 
•Past actions or flashbacks serve as orientation clauses. 
•Events are recognized changes in state, such as 
completion of an activity or arriving at a decision point.
Outcomes  Segments in which the narrator describes the perceived 
outcome of actions and events, such as resolution of the 
problematic situation by achieving the goal. 
  
  Figure 1  Classification Categories for Narrative Segments                                        Davidson 1997 
                                                                                                                                              
 
During this research four interviews have been conducted. What matters is the quality rather 
than the amount of material that is collected. The narrative ability of different individuals also 
differs greatly. During 2004 two middle managers and two top managers were interviews. All 
the interviews were taped and then transcribed in detail. The four accounts have then been 
divided into categories, discussed, compared and contrasted. The narratives have then been 
interpreted. The role of the researcher is to interpret the information and come up with a new 
text that will bear this interpretation (Van Maanen, 1988). Interpretation is part of the story-
work carried out by the storyteller but also the researcher, who reads meaning into events, 
infusing them with symbolic significance, which resonates with his or her audience. 
 
Although many researchers propose that individuals draw on cognitive schemes and other 
knowledge structures in order to make decisions and act (Fiske and Taylor, 1991) it is 
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expressions among the informants to identify mental schemes for how to act and interact.  
 
For and against narrative method 
 
By the criteria of scientific knowledge, the knowledge carried by narratives is not very 
impressive. Formal logic rarely guides the reasoning, the level of abstraction is low, and the 
causal links may be established in a wholly arbitrary way ( C, 1998). But peoples 
nonscientific explanations and interpretations of life events are grounded in attempts to 
establish a connection between the exceptional and the ordinary. 
 
A researcher using narrative method is not looking for a general truth. Instead he or she, as a 
narrative researcher and social constructionist, is aware of that everybody has their own 
personal opinion about the phenomenon discussed. However narrative analysis can provide 
detailed insights into individuals understanding of events that are interesting also for  
outsiders. Gabriels (2002) advocates the use of organizational stories as poetic elaborations on 
actual events, as wish-fulfilling fantasies built on everyday experience and as expressions of 
deeper organizational and personal realities. 
 
A constructionist view clearly reveals the impossibility of establishing evaluation criteria. 
Researchers who want to use stories as research instruments must rid themselves of the 
assumption that quality data must be objective, reliable, accurate and must be prepared to 
engage personally with the emotions and the meanings that reside in the text.  
 
There are many dangers in narrative research. One danger is the selective use of 
organizational narratives according to preconceived ideas about what may have taken place. 
There is also a risk of regarding stories as facts. The opposite danger is to regard everything 
as narrative and to lose sight of the importance of actual events in organizations. 
 
Stories may also be used to pursue different research agendas. The overall purpose of a study 
will dictate the precise methodology used, the type and range of stories sought and the ways 
the stories are analyzed. The main disadvantage of eliciting stories is that the researcher risks 
imposing his or her definitions of what is important, meaningful or enjoyable on the text. 
 
At the same time narrative approaches are appropriate for exploring and expressing the 




The unit of analysis in this study is the management in the company and how its view of how 
to conduct business is transformed during the turnaround. The management is represented by 
four people. What kind of people are these four informants? Top management 1 has worked 
in the company since 1976. He has had many different management positions within the 
company both in Sweden and abroad. Top management 2 has worked in the organization 
since the end of the 1980íes, also in different positions both abroad and in Sweden. Middle 
management 1 started in the company1989 and middle management 2 year1998. They explain 
why they have stayed in the company in spite of the problems like this: “I have stayed, I 
believe, because in spite of all of this I like what I do”. (Appendix A. Section 7) “I like to 
work in an environment in which I can make a difference”. (Appendix A. Section 3) “It is 
easy to look back…better not to do that”. (Appendix B. Section 11) “What made me jump out 
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Section 22) “The flexible one realizes that it is about surviving a few years then there will be 
new possibilities.” (Appendix D. Section 12) The informants are people that had a say in what 
took place and could endure the problems. One can detect an optimistic approach in their 
narratives that probably made it possible for them to manage the problems. 
 
                                                    The problems 
 
The problems at Ericsson, according to the informants, were “many companies in the 
company” (Appendix C. Section 1) and that the leadership had abdicated.  “People who were 
charismatic and had good connections in the organization succeeded with building mini-
empires”. (Appendix D. Section 3) The result of this was that many parallel projects with the 
same purpose started. “We existed at 80 different places in the world with research and 
development, it was very inefficient but it took care of the growth”. (Appendix C. Section 9)  
So, on the surface this company is successful and grows very quickly but internally it 
becomes a fractured organization and difficult to manage. It becomes an unfocused 
organization that strives in several different directions at the same time. One of the 
implications of this is that nobody kept track of how money was spent. As an example 
Ericsson had more than fifty different versions of SAP within the same organization. 
(Appendix C. Section 13) When the downturn came management lost track of how it affected 
the organization. And the downturn came extremely quickly. They were still recruiting new 
people when they had to start downsizing the organization. “I remember a project in which I 
was the only one employed at Ericsson. Then there were maybe 8-9 consultants, many of 
them right out of school”. (Appendix D. Section 1) “It happens extremely quickly…to lose 80 
billion in sales…to get rid of the costs is not that easy”. (Appendix B. Section 4)Top 
management 1 describes how they realized what was happening around 2000 and 2001.  
 
“The correlation between how the operators invested and growth changed around 1999. The 
operators continued building but at the same time the growth was not that good. At the 
beginning if year 2000 the incoming orders became weak. Then the sales picked up again at 
the end of year 2000”. “It was heavy…all limitations were gone…we started recruiting, we 
recruited a hell of a lot of consultants. (Appendix B. Section 5) The first quarter of 2001 
everything stopped. The first warning about huge losses came from the company in March 
2001.  
 
Another problem in the company, according to the informants, was the quality of 
management. “Growth demands a certain delegation…but not that the leadership abdicate”, 
concludes one of the top management. (Appendix C. Section 14)  In addition to this it was 
something wrong with the strategy. “I remember 1999, when I lived in Japan. I talked about 
how the market changed, how the youth in Japan behaved and did their shopping, I do not 
think Ericsson understood. I remember I was asked to have an opinion about the strategy. I 
think we became too big”. (Appendix B. Section 27) Top management 1 concludes that the 
company became too big and that the leadership stopped listening. Top management 1 also 
concludes that much more control is needed in an organization like Ericsson both when 
everything goes up but also when things goes down. (Appendix B. Section 12) To summarize, 
it was something wrong both with the companie´s internal and external network. Its identity 
was fractured and a different language was spoken in different parts of the company. Different 
parts of the company had different information about what was going on both inside and 
outside the company. 
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The informants abstract of the turnaround is that “the same thing happened at IBM but we 
managed the situation quicker”. (Appendix B. Section 1) “The company was bleeding it was 
all about survival”.(Appendix D. Section 7) “Some kind of pooling of resources was needed. 
(Appendix D. Section 7) All the informants conclude that the company tries to implement a 
new way to work and top management that they have come honorably out of the 
transformation. All the informants agree on the seriousness of what is taking place. One says 
“it is a big transformation taking place”. (Appendix A. Section 18) Another one says “the 
consultants do not understand the magnitude of this”. (Appendix B. Section 2) A third person 
calls what is happening “a horrible trip”. (Appendix C. Section 17) And the fourth person 
talks about “the crises came”. (Appendix C. Section 5) Finally the transformation is described 
as “revolutionary, messy, extremely messy”. (Appendix A. Section 2) What takes place is an 
effort of solving problems together. Internal knowledge is mobilized and needed information 
transferred to different parts of the company, and between different levels, groups and people. 
 
                                             
                                        Why did the problems appear? 
 
The comments on why the problems in the company appeared are mostly geared towards 
management and organization. One of the middle management says: “I tend to listen less and 
less to what they say, I tend to take in less and less of what management does, as long as they 
do not make a complete fool of themselves. (Appendix A. Section 16) He talks about that he 
dreams about setting up a meeting with his own boss and telling him that he wants to leave 
the company. “Then I am going to go to my boss and tell him that I want to quit, and I feel so 
relieved…it is like therapy. (Appendix A. Section 10) “My closest bosses I do not listen to, 
not very much, for the simple reason, they are managed by details, and they want to manage 
in detail, they have a problem telling what framework I am supposed to work within. That 
message is not communicated…everything I do I am prepared to tear up…I feel no respect for 
my closest bosses…I have a quiet agreement, if you let me be I will deliver…” It is very 
serious critic and he also has a somewhat cynical view of the new CEO that started at the 
beginning of 2003: “A very charismatic person-he invites confidence. He was here and 
presented his goals and values, and what we are supposed to do and so on, for our unit. He 
rattled off about what is important and so on…the usual talk. He knows the numbers and he 
knows what we are doing. And he communicated this in a good way, he likes to be on a stage, 
that is needed…“ 
 
The other middle manager says that: “They recruit managers in a way so that they loose a 
good engineer and get a bad manager”. (Appendix D. Section 2) Most of the critical 
comments come from the middle management but also the top management is critical. Both 
the two top managers agree on that management has been delegated and now the goal is to 
become one company with one management. One of the middle management is critical both 
towards the old COB “I have never had a good picture of X, and then he has been mentioned 
in many strange situations” (Appendix D. Section 11) and the new COB that gets a big bonus 
2003. “What really lowers all confidence I eventually had for X as the new COB was that he 
retroactively managed to fix an unbelievably high compensation, and the motive was that he 
worked so hard, so hard, so hard, and when this spread, when we read about this in the papers 
and realized what it was about, that someone retroactively fixed better conditions for already 
performed work, that is not acceptable…” (Appendix D. Section 13)  
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feeling for that it was money they spent. Some kind of pooling of resources is needed”. 
(Appendix D. Section 7)   
 
                                         How were the problems solved 
 
“We have implemented one business system in all of the company so that we can keep track 
of numbers”. “It is better to have hundred people that know ten numbers, then ten people who 
know hundred numbers. (Appendix A. Section 17) “We try to implement a new way to 
work”. ” We want to focus”. (Appendix C. Section 4) “Now it feels like we are a totally 
different company”. (Appendix C. Section 4)  “The R&D machine has been reduced with 
half. The costs are a third of what they were in the beginning”. (Appendix C. Section 35, 36)  
 
                                      How were employees influenced? 
 
On how the employees were influenced by the turnaround the informants says: “People have 
felt bad, they have felt apathy. People have been ironic and talked shit about the company”. 
(Appendix A. Section 5) “Employees have problems sleeping… they leave work…search for 
new things to do”. (Appendix A. Section 18) Middle management 2 expresses the drama in 
what is taking place like this: “One day we were asked to sit in our rooms, then middle 
management walked around in the corridor, from room to room and told people if they could 
stay or not…during this period a third of the people were fired. I think this took place in May 
2001”. (Appendix D. Section 9) He also says: “From being glorified one month, we were as 
an organization producing bad results. We were supposed to reduce the staff because 
everybody else was supposed to do that. It did not matter that our section produced good 
results”. (Appendix D. Section 6) 
 
What happened at the company was reported, discussed and criticized daily in the media and 
it also influenced the employees in many different ways. Middle management 1 tells how he 
is approached by people outside the company:  “Surprise…oh are you still there…yes, you are 
working for Ericsson, and then they get like this…oh dear, poor you, soon the bell tools for 
you! And you know, they put their head on the side like this and…oh, oh, how is it, are many 
fired, have you managed, well yes that is good for you, but you can see that they think, well in 
six months you are also there”. (Appendix A. Section 11) Many other things also happened 
that in some way threatened the life of the employees. One example is that the Chinese 
telecom company Huawei tried to expand in Sweden and employ some of the engineers that 
were fired from Ericsson. The first question these engineers got was if they could bring 
documents about product development with them. 
 
Middle management 1 informs about how the cut downs were handled by management in 
front of the employees: “We understand if it hurts, but it is good for Ericsson, and if you do 
not like it, you are free to leave. It was such difficult times. If people complained and said: 
this is the organization not going to accept, then it came very, very hard from above…walk 
straight, do as the others do…as managers we were allowed to tell people: now you just 
implement this even if it is going to hurt…” 
 
Top management 1 tells about how he tries to inform the employees about what is going to 
happen during the turnaround: “I had internal meetings and supplied information…since it 
was a big change in the organization, they asked us many questions that we had no answer to. 
(Appendix B. Section 25) He also says: “It is difficult to talk about your vision for the future 
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Management had no experience of crises. “You must remember from were we came, growth, 
growth, growth”. (Appendix C. Section 29) Middle management 1: “Before I had fifty people 
but now we are only thirty, but we are still supposed to produce the same output as with fifty 
people”. Top management 1 says: ”It is always nervous, first we could not show results, it 
was mostly pictures and talk…but when we could show results…” 
 
Middle management expresses how the attitudes were in the company: “If people did not 
want to implement a new system or a new way of working it was solved with force. Either 
they did as management said or they were asked to leave. (Appendix A. Section 3)  
 
On the question if employees got sick middle management 1 says:” Yes, they have problems 
sleeping, that is obvious stress symptoms, many people stop working here, they change, 
quickly…it is a big transformation taking place…people search for other thing to 
do…because where I am is to bad, not that I want to do something else…they try to get away 
from something and that is not the best way to change your profession or what you do…I 
notice this all the time, that is what happens in my near surrounding…people become sick, I 
am sick myself all the time, there are colds that arrive all the time, the physical resistance is 
low…there are many people in my surrounding that ends up in this situation…(Appendix A. 
Section 18) 
 
On the question if the employees had confidence in management during the turnaround 
middle management 1 answers like this:” Not that I have experienced. People have 
understood the situation. I have experienced that they look very much backwards and say, 
“they should have thought about this much earlier”, to have minimized the losses. But it is 
easy to say…this is not the first time a big corporation get rid of people…it is not the first 
time these arguments are presented, it is not the first time, we will make the same mistake 
again, everything happened so quickly, we did not have the time…well, the baby was thrown 
out with the washing water…” 
 
Middle management 2 says:” I think most people realized that it was a question about winning 
or losing…that a lot of things were in focus, there was understanding, some managers were 
not competent enough but were involved in selecting who was going to go or stay…they did 
not do the right thing, but in general there was an understanding that the reductions were 
necessary and that there were problems in the organization…” 
 
Top management 2 also talks about how all of this affected people: “I have heard that people 
who did not loose their job, that was not fired, asked themselves, why am I still here”. 
(Appendix C. Section 30) And middle management says: ”It is bullshit that you are safer in 
Sweden if you are Swedish, work hard and have a master in science”. (Appendix D. Section 
14)  “The big change is that I can lose my job, and this safety that you think you have because 
you are Swedish and work in Sweden, that is bullshit…I have a friend who worked for 
Ericsson in Madrid. He got a much better deal when he had to leave Ericsson, than what they 
got in Sweden. He worked twelve years with Ericsson”. (Appendix D. Section 17) 
 
                                       The outcome of the turnaround 
 
The management worked very quickly during the turnaround year 2001 and 2002. The last 
step, reducing 5 billion was already prepared before the new CEO came at the beginning of 
year 2003. Now Ericsson has become one company with one management. The costs are a 
  12third of what they were. But at the same time the management group must work with less 
people but produce the same amount of work as before. On the outcome of the turnaround top 
management are optimistic, “We have come honorably out of it” (Appendix C. Section 12) 
“We have not lost out” (Appendix B. Section 7) “It feels like we are a totally different 
company”. (Appendix C. Section 4)  Middle management 2 says: “I feel happy. I am still in 
the organization. What is happening now is exciting”. (Appendix D. Section 15) During the 
turnaround have new processes been implemented and an extensive amount of new 
knowledge been built and distributed between people and groups at different levels in the 
company. A pooling of resources has taken place and the interpretative schemes for how to do 




The narratives told in this study indicate that the main problem in the company was a 
fractured organization with a management that had abdicated. Nobody kept track of numbers 
and they recruited new employees without limits. It was something wrong both with its 
internal network of people, communications, information resources and cultural norms and its 
external network of relationships with customers, information sources and other associates. 
To solve the problems management quickly becomes centralized during a dramatic 
turnaround. They reduce the amount of employees and consultants extremely quickly with all 
kinds of compensation packages. They also start implementing one business system in all of 
the company to keep track of numbers. Ericsson is still a decentralized organization with 
global operations in 140 countries around the world. But an operational loss of 13 billion SEK 
in 2001 was turned into profitability in Q3 2003 and a profit of 7,8 billion SEK in Q2 2004. 
There was a headcount reduction from 107 000 employees and 17000 consultants to less than 
50 700 employees in Q2 2004. Operational expenditures were reduced from around 88 billion 
SEK to around 33 billion SEK Q2 2004. These activities have influenced the interpretative 
schemes of these four managers in several different ways. This paper distinguishes between 
four different interpretative schemes that have been transformed. The first one has to do with 
how the organization is structured and managed, the second with the economy, the third with 
the internal world and the fourth with the external world of the employees. 
 
•Interpretative scheme 1: Organization 
 
“We are becoming one company with one management”. Before the turnaround power was 
exercised in a decentralized way and now it becomes centralized. “Growth demands a certain 
delegation…but not that the leadership abdicate”.  
 
•Interpretative scheme 2: Economy 
 
A new way of looking at numbers and money are implemented in the company. “It is better to 
have hundred people that know ten numbers, then ten people who know hundred numbers”. 
This has become a sort of mantra that is often repeated by the new CEO during events both 
inside and outside the organization. 
 
•Interpretative scheme 3: Internal world 
 
The demand on how to be as an employee is changed:  ”If you are going to work at Ericsson 
today you must be flexible. You cannot be too proud to do certain things. You must be 
focused and work for the best of the company”.  
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•Interpretative scheme 4: External world 
 
The view of life in more general terms has also been transformed into a more pessimistic one. 
”You are not safe in Sweden even if you are well-educated and work hard”. One of the middle 
management says that the feeling of that if you have a master of science, work well and 
because of this are sure to keep your job, it has disappeared. “That is the big change…people 
are conscious about this…The big change is that I can lose my job, and this safety that you 
think you have because you are Swedish and work in Sweden, that is bullshit…It is just 





The purpose of writing this paper has been to give some insight into how the turnaround of 
Ericsson influenced the management. Using narrative method has made it possible to show 
some of the knowledge building that took place. It has also made it possible to identify verbal 
expressions that can be translated and transformed into interpretative schemes. It is a success-
story that is told in the sense that the company survived. But it is also a turbulent story. 
Employees get sick, depressed and many have to leave their jobs. This is something new as 
one of the top management says “you must remember from were we came, growth, growth, 
growth”. He also says: “It is not so easy to manage a giant like this, and a global one…”The 
organizational setting of Ericsson becomes restructured very quickly depending on 
transformed interpretative schemes for how the business should be conducted. The outcome 
of all of this is one company with one management. The demands on how to be as an 
employee is also changed. But this study also shows that the informants did not only change 
their mental schemes for how Ericsson should be run but also their view of life in a more 
general sense. The turnaround has changed how the management view both their internal and 


























Text segment from interview with middle management 1 
(January 30, 2004) 
 
1. I have worked at Ericsson since 1989 with many different things. Right now I work with 
implementing business systems. Before everybody had their own system, it was difficult to 
keep track of numbers, it was very expensive. Now we are implementing one business system 
in the whole company. Since year 2000 I have worked with SAP. 
Q: How has it been to work at Ericsson during the last four years? 
2. Revolutionary, messy, extremely messy… 
Q: Why did you stay? 
3. Because of that. I like to work in an environment in which I can make a difference…I am 
implementing a new business system, for a few it gets worse but for the rest of us it will get 
better. Before everybody wanted their own system, to take away the system costs money, we 
have to say, that for you it means a step backwards…we understand if it hurts, but it is good 
for Ericsson, and if you do not like it, you are free to leave…it was such difficult times…if 
people complained and said: the organization is not going to accept this, then it came very, 
very hard from above…walk straight, do as the others do…as managers we were allowed to 
tell people: now you just implement this even if it is going to hurt… 
Q: More? 
4.During these years many people have been fired, there has been chaos, reorganizations…at 
the same time we try to implement a new way to work, we want to focus on what we do, we 
are all aware that management are needed in many different places, the management group 
must realize that they are important for the turnaround, at the same time they are burdened 
with reductions, they work during changed conditions such as “before I had fifty people but 
now we are only thirty, but we are still supposed to produce the same output as fifty people”. 
This thing, to cut down and learn how to do things differently, always comes after a certain 
period of layoffs”. 
Q: How have people felt at Ericsson? 
5. Apathy, very sarcastic, ironic…it is not really…people talk shit about the company when 
they get a chance…because it is a ventilator… 
Q: Do they have confidence in management? 
6. Not that I have experienced. People have understood the situation. I have experienced that 
they look very much backwards and say, “they should have thought about this much earlier”, 
to have minimized the losses. But it is easy to say…this is not the first time a big corporation 
cut down on people…it is not the first time these arguments are presented, it is not the first 
time, we will make the same mistake again, everything happened so quickly, we did not have 
the time…well, the baby was thrown out with the washing water… 
Q: Why did you stay? Have you thought about looking for a new job? 
7. Yes, sure. I have stayed, I believe, because in spite of all this I like what I do…since year 
2000 I have worked very much with change, I have a certain technical background, I have a 
background from Ericsson, I know what is important for middle management, and for an 
employee here…I have insight into the new system…it is fun to work in that area…to get 
people to understand a new way to work…efficient and easy for everybody…I try to make 
people feel happy… 
Q: Have you felt down, depressed? 
8. Yes, sure, down, without strength and apathetic, very much… 
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9. I have tried to speak with friends, activate myself, do other things outside work…the last 
one and a half year, been involved in several implementations that have gone very, very 
fast…we were rationalizing a lot,…we shortened the process, for certain parts of the 
organization, now we just implement it, then you just have to like it…I have made a few of 
these kind of implementations, it made me very, very tired this summer…I was really…on the 
border of burn-out…luckily enough I have taken a course in stress management… 
Q: What did you learn then? 
10.Year 2000 they educated a lot of internal stress consultants, they were supposed to be a 
support in the organization, they talked about stress, how to get a better feeling in the 
organization for this, I got an education that takes two days, they went through a lot of 
medical and psychological factors, what you do with an employee to…and so on…therefore I 
can say that I was pretty stressed, rundown, tired…earlier you asked me about my confidence 
in management…during circumstances like this not very good…I said to myself, I wonder 
what happens if I go and say that I want to quit…you know, I can feel that when you reason 
with yourself like that, when you get up in the morning, and…yes…it feels pretty good.  
Today I am going to go to work, then I am going to go to my boss and tell him that I want to 
quit, and you feel so relieved…eh…it is therapy…well, yes, no, I better activate myself with 
other things… 
Q: What kind of reactions did you meet from people outside Ericsson, during this period? 
11. Surprise…oh are you still there…yes, you are working for Ericsson, and then they get like 
this…oh dear, poor you, soon the bell tools for you! And you know, they put their head on the 
side like this and…oh, oh, how is it, are many fired, have you managed, well yes that is good 
for you, but you can see that they think, well in six months you are also there… 
Q. But you did not get burned out. Why? 
12. No, I did not. The summer and the vacation came just in time for me. I took on another 
project privately, to renovate my apartment, and to do it myself…in the middle of all this 
tiresome business did I manage to get some energy. I did something for myself. But then of 
course, I isolate myself from the environment, I have no strength…I need distance, to be 
alone, and to do what I thought was important for myself… 
Q: This took place this summer? 
13. Yes, now things are working again. I like the project team we have built… 
Q: What do you think about your COO? 
14. A very charismatic person-he invites confidence. He was here and presented his goals and 
values, and what we are supposed to do and so on, for our unit. He rattled off about what is 
important and so on…the usual talk. He knows the numbers and he know what we were 
doing. And he communicated this in a good way, he likes to be on a stage, that is needed…the 
other COO made a fool of himself in Television, he was a person that media probably like to 
crucify…because… 
Q: What do you think about the new chairman of the board that came 2002? 
15. I think people are scared of him… 
Q: What do you mean? 
16. We have heard how much he had cut down at Electrolux, that he had cut down a lot…we 
know it would come, but I think it was with divided feelings…for me I hoped we would get a 
person who was tougher than X (the former COB). Here is the framework-fix it! But also I 
must say that I tend to listen less and less to what they say, I tend to take in less and less of 
what the management do, as long as they do not make a complete fool of themselves… 
Q: Who do you listen to? 
17.The one I listen to…I listen to the ambitions that C-H (CEO) has…that every manager 
should have a responsibility to keep track of the numbers, it is better to have hundred people 
  16that know ten numbers, than ten people who know hundred numbers, it is better to spread  the 
responsibility like that…to get a common way to work…everybody is supposed to know what 
they do… 
My closest bosses I do not listen to, not very much, for the simple reason, they are managed 
by details, and they want to manage in detail, they have a problem telling what framework I 
am supposed to work within. That message is not communicated…everything I do I am 
prepared to tear up…I feel no respect for my closest bosses…I have a quiet agreement, if you 
let me be I will deliver… 
Q: Have you seen people become sick? 
18.Yes, they have problems sleeping, that is obvious stress symptoms, many people stop 
working here, they change, quickly…it is a big transformation taking place…people search 
for other things to do…because where I am is to bad, not that I want to do something 
else…they try to get away from something and that is not the best way to change your 
profession or what you do…I notice this all the time, that is what happens in my near 
surrounding…people become sick, I am sick myself all the time, there are colds that arrive all 
the time, the physical resistance is low…there are many people in my surrounding that ends 




Text segment from interview with top management 1 (IB) 
(August 26, 2004) 
 
1. The same thing happened at IBM, we managed the situation quicker. 
2. The consultants do not understand the magnitude…to reduce costs with 55 billion. They 
learn more from us than… 
3. I have worked at Ericsson since 1976. In different places…I have worked in Japan, been 
COO for two Ericsson-companies. In March 2001 X (former CEO)  recruited me to conduct 
this program…now we have reached our goal… 
4. We realized what was happening around 2000/2001…The correlation between the 
operators way to invest and growth (CAPEX) turned around 1999. Year 2000 it was 
hysteric…they continued building but at the same time the growth was not that good…It 
happens extremely quickly…to lose 80 billion in sales…to get rid of the costs are not that 
easy…big losses, both systems and mobiles…marginal loss of 75 billion… 
5. At the beginning of year 2000 weak orders…during the later part of 2000 the sales came, it 
was heavy…all limitations were gone, we started recruiting, we recruited a hell of a lot of 
consultants…we had a runrate of about 55 billion, yearly, today 33 billion. The first quarter of 
2001 everything stooped, but still people were being recruited… 
6. When we left year 2001 we had an R&D machine that… 
7. We have not shot ourselves, we have not lost out…(IB) 
8. In the middle of all of this they introduce 3G… 
9. Every week we sat down and…many did not realize the crises we were in…it is not so easy 
to inform about such things…of course mistakes are done… 
Q: Why did this happen? 
10. It relates to all of 1990-we had no problems with money, that was the last problem we 
had, it was the access to…management was delegated…it easily happens when everything 
goes fine… 
11. It is easy to look back…better not to do that… 
12. Much more control over work, both when it goes up and down… 
13. We can manage this…it is possible… 
  1714. When X put this group together…we had group work, everybody looked at each 
other…this is not possible…where the hell do we start…maybe we should start reducing 
employees… 
15. July 1999, X was appointed CEO…X initiated the 40-group…the board have different 
committees…they appointed a committee that was supposed to be a support for the COO…it 
was not an overcoat, they had several meetings…I attended these meetings…at the board 
meeting they have no time to attend to all details…I reported to the board…this was not 
interpreted correct from the outside… 
16. It is always nervous, first we could not show results, it was mostly pictures and talk…but 
when we could show results… 
17. The first step was to reduce the yearly costs with 20 billion…but soon we realized that 
this is not enough… 
18. At the same time they made the emission public… 
19. The fall of 2001 I believed that most people in Ericsson realized that this looks 
problematic…doubt, we had no experience of reducing… 
20. We put a lot of effort into communicating this first… 
21. The plans we made we followed very closely, we were even a little bit better…I met many 
people from banks and so on…then they did not doubt that we would manage… 
22. It is difficult to talk about your vision for the future when you cut down… 
23. I led the group…they were picked by X…from March 2001 it got another 
agenda…meetings every quarter were changed to every month… 
24. I think the reductions were of the correct size, 20 billion from the beginning, you cannot 
take to little and not to much,…it is not possible, it makes the organization confused… 
25. I had internal meetings and gave information…since it was a big change in the 
organization, they asked us many questions that we had no answer to… 
26. We continued with this project according to what we had decided… 
27. I remember 1999, when I lived in Japan…I talked about the development, how the youth 
in Japan behaved and did their shopping, I do not think Ericsson understood…I remember I 
was asked to have an opinion about the strategy…I think we became to big… 




Text segment from interview with top management 2 (PAS) 
(Aug 26, 2006) 
 
1. Before it was many companies in the company… 
2. May 2001 I was asked by X to supervise the turnaround. 
3. Together with Y I managed the transformation. We were going to become a company with 
one management… 
4. Now it feels like we are a totally different company… 
5. You can divide the time in two parts, 1990-2000, and 2000-2004. The first is the big 
expansion, but from year 2000 and to today a new era has started… 
6. The bubble burst…the fall of 2000 in USA I saw…this market does not hold. 
7. Ericsson´s first warning came in March 2001…sales decreased extremely quickly, growth 
had decreased, nobody reacted or said stop…Ericsson was on its way to become a 300 billion 
company,  
8. It was one of the leading telecom companies in the world 
9. A lot of things happened…we existed at 80 different places in the world with research and 
development, it was very inefficient but it took care of the growth… 
  1810. We sat once a week, X and I, and Y… 
11. All the time we were worried, about how much to cut, how much to do… 
12. Has it been a negative reduction…absolutely not, we have come honorably out of it… 
13. Now we have a straight, and simple organization…before we used 58 different dialects of 
SAP…we are so special… 
14. Growth demands a certain delegation…but not that the leadership abdicate…we had many 
expatriates…unfortunately they came home and lost their job… 
15. We had 8 000 consultants in the company, especially in the development… 
16. It has not been easy for us…I have recruited many of them…but now the picture is 
different… 
17. It became more and more painful…a horrible trip… 
18. The change of chairman…it has nothing to do with this…here comes Mike the Knife from 
Electrolux…a chairman of the board does not work like that, it is not an executive job… 
19. Ramqvist…really we should not speculate…I think, there was a massive chase on him  
20. One chairman wants to leave…it was not a question in the company… 
21. The emission that came…it came as a good proof for employees and customers…that the 
market actually believed in Ericsson…and that Ericsson´s management could handle the 
crises… 
22. What made me jump out of bed every morning was that this is possible, this we will be 
able to manage…the management group was good… 
23. The visions became more of survival… 
24. Now this story is over, this chapter is written… 
25. The group of forty people existed before as a bigger management group with 
representatives from abroad, it was a group put together for discussion, information exchange 
and so on that X (former CEO)  invited once every quarter… 
26. What we learned…inspect what you expect… 
27. Do it properly instead of… 
28. If we had said in Q1 that we were going to reduce 50 billion they had never…another 
wisdom, as soon as you have some kind of feeling, the smallest indication…react quickly 
instead of taking slow steps, analyzing… 
29. You must remember from where we came, growth, growth, growth… 
30. I have heard that many people who did not loose their job, that was not fired, ask 
themselves, why am I still here… 
31. The last step, reducing 5 billion was already prepared for before the new executive 
came… 
32. The graph is in our back…it is a fantastic thing that it rushed away like this…now we 
have facit… 
33. It is not so easy to manage a giant like this, and a global one… 
34. The R&D machine that we have today is 24 billion, it has been reduced with half… 
35. The costs are a third of what they were in the beginning… 
36. The emission…I bought what I could… 
 
Appendix D 
Text segment from interview with middle management 2 
(Nov 8, 2004) 
 
1. I started at Ericsson November 30, 1998. I have a master in science from Chalmers. First I 
said “never Ericsson”. The company had no status. Many of my friends started there, they 
talked a lot about where in the organization they were and what contracts they worked with. 
But to me it seemed to be small possibilities to influence your situation in an organization 
  19with more than 100 000 employees. I worked five years in the forrestry industry and was 
happy with that.  But then I started at Ericsson. First I worked in development. Many projects 
were started. They recruited consultants without any limits. I remember a project in which I 
was the only one employed at Ericsson. Then there were maybe 8-9 consultants, many of 
them came right out of school. Almost all of them were put into education immediately. 
2. I have been used to taking initiatives myself and have good bosses. But the first job at 
Ericsson was a letdown. They recruit managers in a way that they loose a good engineer and 
get a bad manager. That is something I have seen many times. It is boring. It is a lot of this 
that friends pick friends…but they are not happy, they would probably be happier with being 
specialists…Now I am at the market side since four years back. 
3. One problem was that they built parallel organizations, three different groups were working 
with the same problem, that is crazy, even if they produce a little bit different results…they 
build empires in the organization, this is an enormous waste of resources…but people 
who were charismatic and had good connections in the organization they succeeded with 
building mini-empires. That was a pity… 
4. At the beginning of year 2001 everything collapsed…I have to think…I changed work in 
February 2001, then it was still good, there had been no reductions…I changed from 
development, it was very frustrating work, you worked with something, you had no feeling 
for how it was going to be used, and they stopped the projects all the time…sure it was a 
pleasant life, but I was used to working in sharper projects…so I changed to the market side. I 
worked with new accounts…we are the people who through out existing suppliers and take 
their job, we grabbed new licenses and new affairs, things were happening quickly all the 
time. I worked all the time with Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Vietnam. It was very 
exciting…it was another tempo…certain periods people worked 80 hours during a week, they 
slept at work, that was exciting… 
5…two months later, from I started working there, from everything being incredibly good and 
great, the crises came, we had a good organization but there was no way we could escape 
what was now happening, for a while half of us were supposed to leave…we made a lot of 
profit, the key numbers per employee was high, it is easy to measure such things when you 
work at the market side…from being glorified one month, we were incredibly good, so it 
became, now we are doing bad results as an organization, everybody have to reduce…I have 
seen numbers that we were 107 000 or 112 000. I have seen number that we came down to 47 
000 but I think we ended up at 50000… 
6. We were supposed to reduce the staff because everybody else were supposed to do that, 
then it did not matter that our section had good results and good businesses…the air went out 
of the new businesses also.. 
7. X (former CEO)  symbolized the cut downs…still he was very competent, he probably 
wanted to leave, but he took his responsibility…we heard nothing from X (former COB), and 
if we heard something it was not very positive…from my perspective he was a person that 
meant no good…Everything was about X (former CEO)… 
As a media person he was not the best, but in the company he was respected…and he did 
something, the company was bleeding, it was all about survival, there was loyalty and 
understanding, even from people who got fired…there were exceptions of course, people 
realized that something had to be done…many had totally lost a feeling for that it was money 
they spent…they started and closed down projects, they had parallel projects. They did the 
same thing at three different places in the organization. Some kind of pooling of resources 
were needed… 
8. In May 2001 they were going to reduce 30-50% of our section. You can say that Ericsson 
in Stockholm was hit hardest by all this that took place. This is if you look at absolute 
numbers. Telefonplan have been closed, Sundbyberg and Kista have also been hit hard. 
  20Gothenburg have not at all been hit so hard…many local companies have not been hit, and 
Eastern Europe have not been hit… 
We sell a lot there…A big chunk of Ericssons profit comes from Russia and Ukraine. This 
year we sold for 8 billion at our market unit. X (CEO) has been several times to Moscow and 
that region, he tries to help out…The money we made in this region have helped Ericsson to 
survive during these difficult years. That feels good… 
9. During the transformation we were informed that we will have to reduce a lot, but nobody 
know how much. One day we were asked to sit in our rooms, then middle management 
walked around in the corridor, from room to room and told people if they could stay or 
not…during this period a third of the people were fired. I think this took place in May 2001. 
Many were not very happy…we were hit extremely hard in the beginning, then there has been 
minor adjustments… 
10. During the fall…we were not hit, more than they changed the organization all the time…It 
was mostly other parts of the organization that was hit…I heard that they started to reduce 
development, I heard about a project that was going to have sign-off in December. They were 
informed after the summer that in December we will tell you who is going to be fired…that 
was maybe not the best way to increase the moral…when you work to develop a product you 
must work very hard, to motivate people to work 60 hours a week is maybe not so easy when 
you know that you are going to be fired…there were probably faults with how the reduction 
of people took place…now it is even tougher, now we talk about people who have worked 
maybe, ten or twelve years and have a good position… 
11. I have never had a good picture of  X (former COB) , and then he has been mentioned in 
many strange situations. I do not think he has contributed so much. But X (former CEO)he 
stuck it out…many people understand that X had to take a lot of shit in the press, it was not 
easy, but he was asked to stick it out…he did his best…many people understand that… 
12. People who were on a contract abroad were told that either you take a local contract with 
worse benefits or you go back to your home-organization, business managers came home who 
worked with fluffy things, you must be able to work as one of the team, use the tools we use, 
that is difficult if someone is used to just gliding around, working higher up in the 
organization…but there is no need for thousand of business managers when we have less 
business, we have to change the organization, the flexible realize that it is about surviving a 
few years, then there will be new possibilities…now we lack certain categories and we have 
an excess of other categories…If you are going to work at Ericsson today you must be 
flexible, you cannot be too fancy for certain thing…you have to be focused and work for the 
best of the company… 
13. What really lowers all confidence I eventually had for X as a new COB was that he 
retroactively managed to fix an unbelievable big compensation, and the motive was that he 
worked so hard, so hard, so hard, and when this spread, when we read about this in the papers 
and realized what it was about, that someone retroactively fixed better conditions for already 
performed work, that is not acceptable… 
14. I think most people realized that it was a question about winning or losing…that a lot of 
things were in focus, there was understanding, some managers were not competent enough 
but were involved in selecting who was going to go or stay…they did not do the right thing, 
but in general there was an understanding that the reductions were necessary and that there 
were problems in the organization… 
The feeling that if you have a master of science, if you work well and because of this are sure 
to keep your job, it has disappeared. That is the big change…people are conscious about 
this…The big change is that I can lose my job, and this safety that you think you have because 
you are Swedish and work in Sweden, that is bullshit…I have a friend who worked for 
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got in Sweden. He worked twelve years with Ericsson… 
15. I feel happy, I am still in the organization, what is happening now is exciting… 
16. Huawei (Chinese telecom ) hire engineers that have been fired from Ericsson…the first 
question they get is what kind of development documents they can bring with them… 
17. It is just bullshit that you are safer in Sweden… 
 
Appendix E 




Narrators abstract  The same thing happened at IBM but we managed the 
situation quicker. 
To learn how to do things differently always takes a 
while after a certain period of layoffs.  
“The consultants do not understand the magnitude of 
what has happened, they learn more from us than we 
from them…” 
It is a big transformation taking place. 
The company was bleeding, it was all about survival. 
Some kind of pooling of resources was needed. 
Narrators perspective  We try to implement a new way to work. 
We had no experience of cutting down. You must 
remember from where we came, growth, growth, 
growth… 
We have come honorably out of it. 
It feels like a different company.  
I feel happy. I am still in the organization. What is 
happening now is exciting.  
It has been revolutionary and messy to work during the 
turnaround. 
Orientation/contextual descriptions  “I meet many reactions from people outside Ericsson: 
Surprise…oh are you still there…yes, you are working 
for Ericsson, and then they get like this…oh dear, poor 
you, soon the bell tools for you! And you know, they 
put their head on the side like this and…oh, oh, how is 
it, are many fired, have you managed, well yes that is 
good for you, but you can see that they think, well in 
six months you are also there…” 
The Chinese telecom company Huawei (Chinese 
telecom ) hired engineers that have been fired from 
Ericsson…”the first question they get is what kind of 
development documents they can bring with them…” 
Actors  The actors in this story are Top management 1 who 
started at Ericsson 1976. Top management 2 has 
worked at the company since 1989.  Middle 
management 1 started working at the company 1998. 
And Middle management 2 has worked at the company 
since 1989. Then there is the COO and the COB. They 
have both of them spent most of their life at Ericsson 
working in different positions. Both of them ask to 
leave the company during the turnaround and are 
replaced by a new COB and COO.  Then there is 
something called the Forty Group. It is like a big 
management group with representatives from many 
different parts of the company. In addition to this there 
are many other actors such as media, banks, pension 
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this story. 
Problematic situation  “Too many companies in the company”. Parallel 
projects. A management that abdicated. Nobody kept 
track of money. They recruited consultants without 
limits.  
Goal/problem solution  Management quickly became centralized. They 
reduced the amount of employees and consultants 
extremely quickly with all kinds of compensation 
packages. We have implemented one business system 
in all of the company so that we can keep track of the 
numbers.  
Actions and events  March 2001: Ericsson´s first warning came in March 
2001 
May 2001:  they were going to reduce 30-50 % of our 
section. 
The fall of 2001: I believe most people in Ericsson 
realized that we have a problem.  
April 2002: New COB 
The fall of 2002: The fall of 2002 the COO wants to 
leave. The last 5 billion of cut downs are proposed.  
Spring 2003: New COO  
Annual meeting 2003: The extra bonus of the  new 
chairman of the board causes problems. 
The summer of 2003: The emission of 30 billion 
Outcomes  One company with one management. A simpler 
organization. The costs are one third of what they were. 
The management group must work with less people but 
do the same work as before.  
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